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Abstract
In this paper, we design the optimal contract when two agents can collude un-
der asymmetric information. They have correlated types, produce complementary
inputs and are protected by limited liability. Therefore, a joint manipulation of
reports allows them to internalize informational and productive externalities. We
show that by taking advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric in-
formation, even though they collude, the principal can achieve the outcome without
collusion regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation. In particular, the
principal can implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-proof
way while this is impossible if collusion occurs under complete information.
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Collusion is an old and recurring phenomenon in organizations and has been a main
theme of research for organizational sociologists.1 Their common view is that behavior
in organizations is often best predicted by the analysis of group as well as individual
incentives. Hence, they think that incentive schemes must account for the possibility that
members form coalitions to manipulate their functioning. However, the design of such
incentive schemes necessitates a good understanding of coalition formation. In particular,
understanding the transaction costs in coalition formation is fundamental since it helps
us to predict under what circumstances agents can successfully form coalitions and to
design incentive schemes which take advantage of the transaction costs in dealing with
collusions.
In this paper, we study mechanism design when the agents can collude under asym-
metric information. We identify the transaction costs in coalition formation generated
by asymmetric information and derive the optimal mechanism which fully exploits the
transaction costs to deter collusion. In particular, we show that asymmetric information
can eﬀectively create barriers to coalition formation making the agents fail to realize gains
from collusion. Indeed, this result was conjectured by Pfeﬀer (1981):
￿it is probably the lack of knowledge about the preferences and beliefs of others within
the organization that constitutes a major barrier to the formation of coalitions (p. 166).￿
More precisely, we study collusion between two units (agents) in a multi-divisional ￿rm.
The principal is the owner of the ￿rm and the agents produce perfectly complementary
inputs: to produce one unit of the ￿nal good, the ￿rm needs a unit from each agent. Each
agent has private information about his cost parameter (type) and is protected by limited
liability. An agent can have either an L-type (low cost type) or an H-type (high cost type)
and an agent￿s type is correlated with the other￿s type. Despite simple and speci￿cf e a t u r e s
of out setting, it allows us to capture two general externalities which make collusion have
bites. Precisely, an agent￿s report about his type aﬀects the other agent￿s payoﬀ through
two channels: correlation creates information externalities and complementarity creates
production externalities.2 Therefore, the agents have the incentive to coordinate their
1See Crozier (1967) and Dalton (1959).
2Complementatiry is not enough to make collusion have a bite in our setting since Laﬀont and Marti-
mort (1997) show that when the types are independent, collusion can be deterred at no cost even if there
is no transaction cost in coalition formation.
1reports in order to internalize these externalities. Although we apply the model to the
internal organization of a ￿rm, our model can also be applied to the regulation of ￿rms
producing complementary inputs (Gilbert and Riordan, 1995, Laﬀont and Martimort,
1997).
Before we study collusion, we characterize the optimal mechanism without side-contracting
(i.e. the optimal mechanism when the agents do not collude). In our framework, full rent
extraction, a result well-known from CrØmer and McLean (1985), cannot be achieved
since limited liability imposes a bound on the principal￿s capacity to penalize the agents.
Hence, the optimal mechanism is derived from a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent
extraction. The optimal quantity schedule, de￿ned with respect to the sum of the agents￿
costs, is decreasing in the case of negative or weak positive correlation while the sched-
ule is non-monotonic in the case of strong positive correlation. In the latter case, the
rent obtained by an H-type is mainly determined by the quantity produced when one
agent has an H- t y p ea n dt h eo t h e rh a sa nL-type. Therefore, it is optimal to introduce a
large downward distortion in the quantity produced at this state of nature such that the
quantity is smaller than the quantity produced when both agents have an H-type.
After analyzing the optimal mechanism without side-contracting, we study the col-
lusion between the two agents. Drawing on the methodology developed by Laﬀont and
Martimort (1997, 2000), we model the collusion by a side-contract oﬀered by a benevolent
and uninformed third-party who maximizes the sum of the agents￿ payoﬀs. The third-
party uses the side-contract to implement joint manipulations of reports. We show that
the collusion-proofness principle holds in our model and characterize the set of collusion-
proof mechanisms. A mechanism is collusion-proof if it satis￿es the coalition incentive
constraints. In the presence of asymmetric information between the agents, the constraints
are written in terms of the virtual costs i n s t e a do ft h er e a lc o s t s .
Before we analyze the impact of asymmetric information on collusion, we investigate
whether the optimal mechanism without side-contracting exhibits any room for collusion
by considering the case in which collusion takes place under complete information be-
tween the agents. It turns out that, under Bayesian implementation, there exists room
for collusion only when the optimal quantity schedule is not monotonic (equivalently,
when there is strong positive correlation). However, when we require dominant-strategy
implementation,3 there exists room for collusion when there is negative correlation as well.
As the main result, we show that under Bayesian implementation, the optimal mech-
3For the distinction between Bayesian implementation and dominant-strategy implementation, see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, pp. 270-271).
2anism without side-contracting can be implemented in a collusion-proof way without any
loss regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation if collusion takes place under
asymmetric information.4 We also show that in the case of weak negative correlation, the
principal can implement the optimal quantity schedule in dominant strategies and in a
collusion-proof way without loss if collusion takes place under asymmetric information.
To give an intuition of the main result, we consider the case of strong positive cor-
relation. We ￿rst note that, in this case, there exists room for collusion only when one
agent has an L- t y p ea n dt h eo t h e rh a sa nH-type. In this state of nature, the agents
have an incentive to report that both of them have an H-type since, given the non-
monotonic quantity schedule, this manipulation of reports makes each of them to produce
more quantity and this increase in quantity allows an L-type to obtain more rent while it
does not hurt an H-type since the latter￿s ex post participation constraint always binds.
However, the fact that the manipulation makes an H-type produce more quantity creates
an incentive problem within the coalition; an L-type￿s incentive to pretend to have an
H-type to the third-party is larger in the presence of the manipulation than in its absence
since his rent is increasing in the quantity produced by an H-type. Therefore, in order to
implement the collusion, the third-party has to give an L- t y p em o r er e n tt h a nh ew o u l d
obtain in the absence of collusion. This additional rent is the transaction costs created
by asymmetric information. Since the transaction costs are larger than the gains from
collusion, the agents fail to collude.
From a theoretical point of view, our paper extends Laﬀont and Martimort (2000)
who study collusion in a framework of public good provision when agents￿ types are cor-
related.5 The main diﬀerence in terms of the setting is that they do not assume limited
liability and therefore the principal can fully extract the rent in the absence of collusion as
in CrØmer and McLean (1985). They furthermore limit their analysis to the case of weak
positive correlation and the two polar cases of almost perfect correlation and no correla-
tion. As their main result, they show that collusion prevents the principal from achieving
the ￿rst-best outcome and restores the continuity in the principal￿s payoﬀ.H o w e v e r ,i n
their optimal collusion-proof mechanism, asymmetric information does not generate any
transaction cost except in the limit case of almost perfect correlation. We show that when
the agents have limited liability, collusion is irrelevant in that the principal can imple-
4This means that, in the case of strong positive correlation, the principal can implement the optimal
non-monotonic schedule in a collusion-proof way without additional cost. This result holds as long as the
probability of having two L-types is larger than the probability of having one L-type and one H-type,
which is satis￿ed if the probability of having two L-types is close to the probability having two H-types.
5They also study a two-type setting.
3ment the optimal mechanism without side-contracting in a collusion-proof way without
loss regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation by exploiting the transaction
costs.6
Collusion under dominant-strategy implementation was ￿rst studied by Laﬀont and
Maskin (1980). Using a diﬀerential approach, they show that there is a strong tension
between individual and coalition incentives when dominant-strategy implementation is
required. Laﬀont and Martimort (1997) show that in the case of no correlation, the
optimal contract without side-contracting can be implemented in a collusion-proof way
and in dominant strategies. Hence, we generalize their result to the case of weak positive
and weak negative correlation.
The result that asymmetric information can make collusion ineﬃcient was also ob-
tained by Jeon (forthcoming) and Jeon and Menicucci (2005). However, in both papers,
the agents￿ types are independently distributed. In the ￿rst paper, which extends Laﬀont
and Martimort (1997)￿s adverse selection framework by adding moral hazard (eﬀort), the
principal is constrained to use uniform transfers and this generates room for collusion. In
the second paper, they consider a setting of monopolistic screening and room for collusion
arises since buyers can engage in arbitrage by signing a side-contract.
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that when each worker has private information
on his non-wage bene￿t, the workers may receive a total compensation less than their
total contribution since they fail to agree on a division of surplus should they leave for
an e w￿rm. Although they analyze coalition formation under asymmetric information,
they do not study the principal￿s mechanism design. In contrast, we ￿rst characterize the
coalition incentive constraints under asymmetric information and then ￿nd the transfer
scheme which allows the principal to implement the second-best quantity pro￿le.
Dana (1993) and Jansen (1999) characterize the optimal mechanism under correlated
types and limited liability in a two-type setting. Dana studies the case in which each agent
produces a ￿nal product while Jansen studies the case in which each agent produces a
complementary input. None of them studies collusion.7
Our paper is related to the literature analyzing contracting between a principal and
privately informed suppliers of complementary inputs (Baron and Besanko 1992, 1999
and Gilbert and Riordan). They compare the case of informational decentralization in
6We note that the principal￿s payoﬀ in our optimal collusion-proof mechanism is continuous since
limited liability restores continuity, as is shown by Robert (1991).
7Our framework is more general than Jansen￿s one since, in our paper, the principal decides the
quantity to produce while, in his paper, the principal decides solely whether to produce or to shutdown.
4which each agent knows only the cost of producing his own input with the case of infor-
mational consolidation in which one consolidated agent knows the costs of producing both
inputs without specifying the mechanism which induces the agents to share their private
information. By contrast, in our model, we specify this mechanism and identify the trans-
action costs generated by asymmetric information which, in turn, can be exploited by the
principal.8
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section
3, we study as a benchmark the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting. In
Section 4, we prove the collusion-proofness principle and characterize the set of collusion-
proof grand-mechanisms. In Sections 5 and 6, we study collusion under asymmetric
information distinguishing Bayesian implementation (Section 5) from dominant-strategy
implementation (Section 6). Section 7 concludes. All the proofs which are not presented
in the main texts are relegated to Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Basic Setting
We consider the production decision of a ￿rm composed of two divisions (agents). The
production process consists of two stages, intermediary and ￿nal stage. Each agent is
charged with one stage. The production technology of the agents is Leontief and one-to-
one: to produce a unit of output, the ￿rm needs a unit from each stage. The principal
(the owner) has to decide the quantity of outputs to produce, which is denoted by q.
The principal cannot observe realized costs. She uses transfers to induce the agents to
produce.
Agent i￿s utility, with i ∈ {1,2},i sg i v e nb y :
Ui = ti − θiq,
where θi represents agent i￿s cost parameter and ti the transfer from the principal to agent
i.A g e n ti￿s cost parameter (type) θi is his private information. θ1 and θ2 are drawn from
a joint distribution with the common support Θ ≡ {θL,θH}. The joint distribution is
supposed to be common knowledge. Let ∆θ ≡ θH − θL > 0. The agent with θi = θL
is called an L-type and the agent with θi = θH is called an H-type. Let p(θi,θj) denote
8Furthermore, in their models, consolidation changes the participation constraint from the individual
one to a group participation constraint. and types are independently distributed.
5the probability of having a state of nature (θi,θj) for (i,j) ∈ {1,2}. For expositional
simplicity, we introduce the following notation:
p(θL,θL)=pLL,p (θL,θH)=p(θH,θL)=pLH,p (θH,θH)=pHH.
We denote conditional probability by p(•| • ).W ea s s u m et h a tθ1 and θ2 can be positively or








When θ1 and θ2 are negatively correlated, the reverse of the above inequality holds. Let
ρ ≡ pLLpHH − (pLH)
2 denote the degree of correlation.
The principal maximizes her pro￿t, which consists of revenue from selling outputs
minus transfers. Her objective function is given by:




where S0(•) > 0, S0(0) = ∞ and S
00(•) < 0. We assume that the revenue from selling
outputs is large enough to employ both agents for any realization of cost parameter.
According to the revelation principle, a grand-mechanism, M,b e t w e e nt h ep r i n c i p a l
and the agents takes the following form:
{t1(b θ1,b θ2),t 2(b θ1, b θ2),q(b θ1, b θ2)},
where b θi is agent i￿s report about his cost parameter to the principal.
Each agent￿s reservation utility is normalized to zero regardless of his type. Each agent
is protected by limited liability in that he has the option of terminating his relationship
w i t ht h ep r i n c i p a la ta n yt i m eb e f o r ei n c u r r i n gt h ep r o d u c t i o nc o s t 10. Therefore, each
agent￿s participation constraints must be satis￿ed ex post:
ti(θ1,θ2) − θiq(θ1,θ2) ≥ 0, ∀(θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ
2.
9The independent case is included in our framework as a particular case with measure zero.
10We assume limited termination penalties, which are common in practice. See Sappington (1983),
Dana (1993) and Lewis and Sappington (1997). If termination pemalities are large enough, the principal
can achieve the ￿rst-best outcome as in CrØmer and McLean (1985).
62.2 Collusion
We model collusion between the two agents by a side-contract oﬀered by a benevolent and
uninformed third-party denoted by T as in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000).11 The
third-party uses the side-contract to implement joint manipulations of reports. He maxi-
mizes the sum of the agents￿ rents subject to a set of incentive compatibility, acceptance,
budget balance and ex post participation constraints.
A side-contract takes the following form:
{φ(e θ1, e θ2),y 1(e θ1, e θ2),y 2(e θ1, e θ2)},
where e θi is agent i￿s report about his cost parameter to the third-party. φ(•) is the
manipulation of report function. This maps any pair of reports made by the agents to
the third-party into the set of (possibly stochastic) reports to the principal. yi(•) is the
monetary transfer from agent i to the third-party.
We assume that the third-party is not a source of money and therefore require that
the following ex post budget balance constraint be satis￿ed for all states of nature:
2 X
i=1
yi(θ1,θ2)=0 , ∀(θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ
2.
We note that there is no loss of generality in restricting the set of feasible side-contracts
to direct revelation mechanisms since the revelation principle applies at this stage of the
game. We assume as in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) that the side-contract is
enforceable even though the secrecy of this contract implies that there is no court of
justice available to enforce it.12
2.3 Timing
The timing is as follows.
1. Nature draws each agent￿s cost parameter. Each agent learns only his own param-
eter.
11The readers might wonder why we do not use an extensive form of bargaining between the agents
to describe collusion. However, any outcome of an extensive form of bargaining can be achieved by a
side-contract designed by the third-party. Hence, the modelling strategy of using the third-party as a
side-contract designer is a shortcut which allows us to characterize the highest bound of what can be
achieved by collusion.
12This assumption allows us to focus on the highest bound of what can be achieved by collusion. It is a
shortcut to capture in a static-context the reputations of the third-party and the agents which guarantee
that the self-enforceability of these contracts would emerge in repeated relationship.
72. The principal proposes a grand-mechanism M.
3. Each agent accepts or refuses it. If at least one agent refuses, each agent gets the
reservation utility and the following sequences do not occur.
4. The third-party oﬀers the side-contract S.
5. Each agent accepts or refuses it. If at least one agent refuses, the grand-mechanism
is played non-cooperatively. In this case, reports are directly made in the grand-mechanism
and the next two stages do not occur.
6. If the side-contract has been accepted, reports in the side-contract are made.
7. The corresponding side-transfers and the reports in the grand-mechanism are made.
8. Production and transfers are enforced.
After the third-party proposes S, a two-stage game is played: ￿rst, the agents accept
or refuse S and then they send their messages either to the principal or to the third-party
depending on their acceptance decisions at the previous stage. We call this two-stage
game the game of coalition formation. We assume that after agent i rejected the side-
contract oﬀered by the third-party, the other agent j (with j 6= i) does not change his
own beliefs about i￿s type.
3 Benchmark: Optimal grand-mechanism without side-
contracting
In this section, we analyze, as a benchmark, the optimal grand-mechanism when there
is no side-contracting. Since the two agents are perfectly symmetric, there is no loss
of generality in looking for the optimal contract within the class of mechanisms which
are symmetric. For expositional simplicity, we introduce the following notation: for the
transfers,
tLL = t1(θL,θL)=t2(θL,θL),t LH = t1(θL,θH)=t2(θH,θL),
tHL = t1(θH,θL)=t2(θL,θH),t HH = t1(θH,θH)=t2(θH,θH);
and for the quantity of outputs to produce,
q = q(θL,θL), b q = q(θL,θH)=q(θH,θL), q = q(θH,θH).
The optimal grand-mechanism should satisfy the following incentive compatibility con-
straints to induce truth-telling: for an L-type,
pLL(tLL − θLq)+pLH(tLH − θLb q) ≥ pLL(tHL − θLb q)+pLH(tHH − θLq); 13 (1)
13In fact, the original expression for the incentive constraint is given by:
pLL
pLL+pLH(tLL − θq)+
8and for an H-type,
pLH(tHL − θH b q)+pHH(tHH − θHq) ≥ pLH(tLL − θHq)+pHH(tLH − θH b q). (2)
The grand-mechanism should satisfy the following ex post participation constraints:
tLL − θLq ≡ uLL ≥ 0, (3)
tLH − θLb q ≡ uLH ≥ 0, (4)
tHL − θH b q ≡ uHL ≥ 0, (5)
tHH − θHq ≡ uHH ≥ 0, (6)
where, for instance, uLL represents the utility that an L-type obtains when the other
agent reports that he has an L-type.
The principal maximizes expected pro￿t, given below, subject to the constraints (1)
to (6):
E(π)=pLL[S(q) − 2tLL]
+2pLH[S(b q) − tLH − tHL]+pHH[S(q) − 2tHH].
The optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting is characterized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 We assume that for ρ > ρ∗ ≡
p2
LH
pLL, ∆θ is small enough relative to θ14.
The optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting is characterized as follows:
(i) Only the L-type￿s incentive constraint and the H-type￿s ex post participation con-
straints are binding.

















pLL+pLH(tLH − θb q) ≥
pLL
pLL+pLH(tHL − θb q)+
pLH
pLL+pLH(tHH − θq). After multiplying both sides of the
inequality by pLL + pLH, we obtain (1).
14This condition allows us to focus on the case in which the H-type￿s incentive constraint is slack: for
more details, see the proof of proposition 1.
9It is decreasing (q∗ > b q∗ ≥ q∗)f o rρ ≤ ρ∗ but non-monotonic (q∗ > q∗ > b q∗)f o r
ρ > ρ∗.15
(iii) The following transfer scheme implements the optimal quantity schedule:
(a) for an H-type: t∗
HL = θH b q∗,t ∗
HH = θHq∗.




∗ + ∆θb q
∗,t
∗
LH = θLb q
∗ + ∆θq












LH = θLb q
∗, for ρ > ρ
∗.
In both cases, the principal has a residual degree of freedom in choosing the transfers
(tLL,t LH).16
When the ex post participation constraints have to be satis￿ed, an H-type has to be
given at least zero rent for every state of nature and this makes the principal concede
a positive rent to an L-type.17 Therefore, the optimal quantity schedule is determined
by the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent extraction. In this trade-oﬀ,a su s u a l ,t h e
relevant cost for an agent is his virtual cost. An L-type￿s virtual cost is equal to his real
cost while an H-type￿s one is larger than his real cost. The H-type￿s virtual cost changes
depending upon the sign and the degree of correlation. To give an intuition about how
the virtual cost is determined, we consider the intermediate state of nature (θL,θH) or
(θH,θL). Suppose that ρ ≤ ρ∗ holds and that the principal increases b q by db q. This will
increase, when the state of nature is (θL,θL),f r o mt∗
LL in proposition 1(iii)(b), the rent
abandoned to each L-type by ∆θdb q. The total increase in cost is given by the sum of the
increase in the production cost 2pLH(θL + θH)db q and the increase in the rent 2pLL∆θdb q
while the increase in revenue is given by 2pLHS0(b q)db q. Therefore, an H-type￿s virtual cost
is given by θH +
pLL
pLH∆θ.
The optimal quantity schedule is decreasing in the sum of the two agents￿ cost param-
eters (q∗ > b q∗ ≥ q∗) if there is negative or weak positive correlation (ρ ≤ ρ∗). In the case
of strong positive correlation (ρ > ρ∗), the sum of the agents￿ virtual costs is smaller when
both agents have an H-type than when one has an L- t y p ea n dt h eo t h e rh a sa nH-type.
This makes the schedule non-monotonic: q∗ > q∗ > b q∗. Intuitively, in this case, when an
15An interesting thing to note is that our case of strong positive correlation ρ > ρ∗ exactly corresponds
to the case of strong positive correlation in Armstrong and Rochet (1999) in which they characterize the
solution of a two-dimensional screening problem. We are grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet for this remark.
16See Appendix 1 for the range of the transfers.
17In terms of the binding constraints, our characterization of the optimal mechanism is similar to those
obtained by Dana (1993) and Jansen (1997).
10L-type pretends to have an H-type, the probability for him to produce b q is much higher
than the probability to produce q. Since his rent is mainly determined by b q,i ti so p t i m a l
for the principal to introduce a large downward distortion in b q.
The principal has a residual degree of freedom in choosing the transfers (tLL,t LH)
which satisfy the Bayesian incentive constraints. When the optimal quantity schedule is
decreasing, by using the degree of freedom, she can satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraints in dominant strategies, given as follows: for an L-type,
tLL − θLq ≥ tHL − θLb q, (7)
tLH − θLb q ≥ tHH − θLq; (8)
for an H-type,
tHL − θHb q ≥ tLL − θHq, (9)
tHH − θHq ≥ tLH − θH b q. (10)
Let MD denote the optimal grand-mechanism implemented in dominant strategies. Under
MD, transfers are given as follows: tLL = θLq∗ + ∆θb q∗,t LH = θLb q∗ + ∆θq∗,t HL =
θH b q∗,t HH = θHq∗.
When the optimal quantity schedule is not monotonic, the H-type￿s Bayesian incen-
tive constraint may not be satis￿ed if the principal proposes MD. In this case, using a
transfer scheme in which the principal gives a rent only when both agents have an L-type
maximizes the chance to satisfy the H-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint.18 In the proof
of proposition 1, we show that when ∆θ is small enough, the principal can strictly satisfy
the H-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint by using this scheme. Thus, in this case, she
still has a residual degree of freedom.
4 Collusion-proof grand-mechanisms under asymmet-
ric information
In this section, we assume that there is asymmetric information between the agents. We
de￿ne the collusion-proof grand-mechanism, prove the collusion-proofness principle and
characterize the set of collusion-proof grand-mechanisms.
18Given the thee binding constraints, the principal has only one degree of freedom in choosing the
transfers. Transforming all the transfers as a function of tLH from the binding constraints and injecting
them into the H-type￿s incentive constraint reveals that minimizing tLH maximizes the chance to satisfy
the constraint.
114.1 De￿nition
In order to de￿ne the collusion-proof grand mechanism, we need to introduce some de￿-
nitions.
De￿nition 1 As i d e - c o n t r a c tS∗ = {φ
∗(•),y∗
1(•),y∗
2(•)} is coalition-interim-eﬃcient with
respect to a grand-mechanism M = {t1(•),t 2(•),q(•)} providing the reservation utilities




+pLH[t1(φLH)+t2(φLH) − (θL + θH)q(φLH)]










p(θj|θi)[ti(φ(b θi,θj)) − yi(b θi,θj) − θiq(φ(b θi,θj))], ∀(θi, b θi) ∈ Θ
2;




yk(θi,θj)=0 , ∀(θi,θj) ∈ Θ
2;
(Ex post IR) ti(φ(θi,θj)) − yi(θi,θj) − θiq(φ(θi,θj)) ≥ 0, ∀(θi,θj) ∈ Θ
2.
A side-contract is coalition-interim-eﬃcient if it maximizes the sum of the agents￿ ex-
pected utilities subject to incentive, acceptance, budget balance and ex post participation
constraints. We note below the diﬀerence between the acceptance constraint and the ex
post participation constraint. The ￿rst is de￿ned in Bayesian terms with respect to the
reservation utility Vi(θi) that agent i can obtain when he plays non-cooperatively the
grand-mechanism after rejecting the side-contract.19 The second is de￿n e di ne xp o s t
terms with respect to zero reservation utility. Therefore, both the principal and the
third-party have equal standing in that the agents are protected by limited liability.
19We note that Vi(θi) represents i￿s utility when j (j 6= i) does not change his beliefs on i￿s type after
observing i￿ sr e j e c t i o no ft h es i d e - c o n t r a c t .
12De￿nition 2 The null side-contract is the side-contract where there is no manipulation
of report (φ(•)=Id(•)) and no transfer between agents (y1(•)=y2(•)).
We now de￿ne the collusion-proof grand-mechanism.
De￿nition 3 A grand-mechanism M = {t1(•),t 2(•),q(•)} providing the reservation utili-
ties Vi(θi) is collusion-proof when the null-side contract is coalition-interim-eﬃcient with
respect to this mechanism.
4.2 Characterization
We ￿rst show that the collusion-proofness principle is valid in our model.
Proposition 2 There is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to oﬀer collusion-
proof mechanisms to characterize the outcome of any perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
game of grand-mechanism oﬀer cum coalition formation.
In general, if the third-party has an informational advantage over the principal or can
use ￿ner instruments than the principal can, the collusion-proofness principle may not
hold. However, in our framework, the third-party has no informational or instrumental
advantage and is subject to the incentive, acceptance, budget balance and ex post partici-
pation constraints. Hence, all the outcomes that can be implemented by allowing collusion
to happen can be mimicked by the principal in a collusion-proof way without any loss.
This collusion-proofness principle simpli￿es our analysis, since what can be achieved by
the principal is contained in the set of collusion-proof grand-mechanisms.
In the next proposition, we characterize the set of symmetric collusion-proof grand-
mechanisms. We focus on the subset of these collusion-proof grand-mechanisms where
the H-type￿s incentive constraint is not binding.20
Proposition 3 A grand-mechanism is collusion-proof if and only if there exist δ (≥ 0),





≥ 0) and †0 = †0(δ)( with †0(0) > 0) such that:
2tLL − 2θLq ≥ t1(b θ1, b θ2)+t2(b θ1, b θ2) − 2θLq(b θ1, b θ2), ∀(b θ1, b θ2) ∈ Θ
2;
tLH + tHL − (θL + θH +
δ
†
∆θ)b q ≥ t1(b θ1, b θ2)+t2(b θ1, b θ2) − (θL + θH +
δ
†
∆θ)q(b θ1, b θ2),
20In fact, it will be shown later on in section 5.2 that the H-type￿s incentive constraint is slack in the
optimal collusion-proof grand-mechanism








0[t1(b θ1, b θ2)+t2(b θ1, b θ2) − 2(θH +
δ
†0∆θ)q(b θ1, b θ2)],
∀(b θ1,b θ2) ∈ Θ
2;
When †
0 =0 , −δq ≥− δq(b θ1, b θ2), ∀(b θ1, b θ2) ∈ Θ
2;
where δ is the multiplier associated with the L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint in
the third-party￿s program.
In Proposition 3, we characterized the coalition incentive constraints under asymmet-
ric information. If the constraints are satis￿ed, the agents have no incentive to jointly
manipulate their reports made to the principal. We note that if δ is equal to zero, the
coalition incentive constraints under asymmetric information are equivalent to the con-
straints derived when there is complete information between the agents. The constraints
under asymmetric information are written in terms of the virtual costs i n s t e a do ft h er e a l
costs. An L-type￿s virtual cost is equal to his real cost since the H-type￿s Bayesian in-
centive constraint is slack while an H-type￿s virtual cost diﬀers from his real cost as long
as δ is strictly positive. δ/† (or δ/†0) represents the cost of giving a rent to an L-type. δ
is equal to zero if the L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint is slack in the third-party￿s
program while δ can be positive when the constraint is binding. Giving a rent to an
L-type can be costly when there exists a tension between incentive, budget balance and
participation constraints. Since an L-type￿s rent depends on the quantity produced by an
H-type, an H-type￿s virtual cost can be diﬀerent from his real cost,21 w h i c hi nt u r nc r e -
ates distortions in the third-party￿s decisions to manipulate reports compared to the case




is larger than his real cost. However, when the state of nature is (θH,θH), the H-type￿s virtual cost,
θH +
δ
†0∆θ, can be either larger or smaller than his real cost since †0 can be positive or negative. †0 can
be negative, for instance, if there is strong negative correlation. In this case, since the state of nature is
likely to be (θL,θH) or (θH,θL), the utility that an L-type can obtain in the side-contract by pretending
to be an H-type to the third-party is essentially determined by φHH, the manipulation of report when
both agents have an H-type. This makes it very costly for the third-party to give a large utility to the
c o a l i t i o nc o m p o s e do ft w oH-types; the higher is the utility given to this coalition, the higher is the rent
abandoned to an L-type. When this negative eﬀect dominates the other bene￿ts from the manipulation,
the third-party will maximize with respect to φHH an objective having a negative sign and therefore †0
is negative.
14in which the decisions are taken under complete information. We note that the principal
has some ￿exibility in choosing δ/† (or δ/†0) because the null-side contract satis￿es the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality in the third-party￿s problem for any (δ,
†, †0) satisfying δ ≥ 0, pLL/pLH > δ/† ≥ 0 and †0(0) > 0.22
One might argue that the principal might ask the agents for the information that
they may have learned during the course of coalition formation. But then the third-party
could react by inducing further manipulations of those reports of the learned information.
These reactions and counter-reactions lead naturally to a problem of in￿nite regress. By
restricting the principal to use grand-mechanisms only contingent on the agents￿ types,
we cut arbitrarily this process in favor of colluding agents and give collusive behavior its
best chance. The restriction strengthens our main result since we show that the optimal
mechanism without side-contracting can be implemented in a collusion-proof way.
5 Failure to collude under asymmetric information:
Bayesian implementation
We study, in this section, the impact of asymmetric information on collusion under
Bayesian implementation (i.e. when the grand-mechanism oﬀered by the principal should
satisfy the Bayesian individual incentive constraints (1) and (2)). For this purpose, we
￿rst examine whether the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting exhibits
any room for collusion when collusion takes place under complete information between
the agents. After identifying the case in which the agents can realize gains from collusion
in the absence of transaction costs, we analyze how the principal can exploit asymmetric
information between the agents to make the collusion ineﬃcient.
5.1 Collusion under complete information
Suppose that collusion takes place under complete information between the agents. We
examine below whether or not the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting
exhibits any room for collusion. When collusion takes place under complete information,
the grand-mechanism should satisfy the following coalition incentive constraints:
(CICLL,LH)2 uLL ≥ uLH + ∆θb q
∗; (11)
(CICLL,HH) uLL ≥ ∆θq
∗; (12)
22See the proof of proposition 3.
15(CICLH,LL) uLH ≥ 2uLL − ∆θq
∗; (13)
(CICLH,HH) uLH ≥ ∆θq
∗; (14)
(CICHH,LL) ∆θq
∗ ≥ uLL; (15)
(CICHH,LH) ∆θb q
∗ ≥ uLH. (16)
We distinguish below two cases: when the optimal quantity schedule without side-contracting
is monotonic (ρ ≤ ρ∗) and non-monotonic (ρ > ρ∗).
Consider ￿rst the case in which the optimal quantity schedule without side-contracting
is monotonic. In this case, the principal can satisfy these coalition incentive constraints
without additional loss. For example, consider the following rent scheme:
uLL =
(pLL + pLH)b q∗ + pLHq∗
pLL +2 pLH
∆θ,u LH =
pLLb q∗ +2 pLHq∗
pLL +2 pLH
∆θ,u HL = uHH =0 .
Under the scheme, the L-type￿s incentive compatibility constraint is binding and all the
coalition incentive constraints are satis￿ed.
Consider now the case in which the optimal quantity schedule without side-contracting
is not monotonic: q∗ > q∗ > b q∗. In this case, the principal cannot implement the schedule
in a collusion-proof way. To show this, we sum up (14) and (16) and obtain b q∗ ≥ q∗,
which is contradictory. Hence, the optimal grand-mechanism exhibits room for collusion.
More generally, proposition 4(ii) below states that whatever the sign and the degree of
correlation, the principal can never implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a
collusion-proof way if collusion takes place under complete information. The intuition
for the result is simple. Since, in the absence of asymmetric information, there exists
no transaction cost in side-contracting, the situation is similar to the case in which the
principal deals with one consolidated agent who has three diﬀerent types: (θL + θL),
(θL + θH), (θH + θH). Thus, the monotonicity condition has to be satis￿ed as it does in
the one-agent case. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4 If collusion takes place under complete information,
(i) When there is negative or weak positive correlation (ρ ≤ ρ∗), the principal can
implement the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting in a collusion-proof way
(ii) The principal can never implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-
proof way. Therefore, when there is strong positive correlation (ρ > ρ∗), the principal can-
not implement the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting in a collusion-proof
way.
165.2 Collusion under asymmetric information
In this section, we assume that collusion takes place under asymmetric information be-
tween the agents. Since we have seen in the previous section that there is no room for
collusion when the optimal quantity schedule is monotonic and the third-party can always
implement the null side-contract, we focus on the case of strong positive correlation in
which the optimal schedule is not monotonic.
From Proposition 1, the set of the rent schemes which implement the optimal mecha-
nism without side-contracting is given by:
{uLL ≥ 0,u LH ≥ 0,u HL =0 ,u HH =0 ,




∗ + pHH∆θb q
∗ ≥ pLHuLL + pHHuLH
o
.
When collusion takes place under asymmetric information, from proposition 3, the
coalition incentive constraints are given as follows:
(CICLL,LH)2 uLL ≥ uLH + ∆θb q
∗; (17)
(CICLL,HH) uLL ≥ ∆θq
∗; (18)





∗ − b q
∗); (19)





∗ − b q
∗); (20)
(CICHH,LL) ∆θq






∗ ≥ uLH +2
δ
†0∆θ(q
∗ − b q
∗); (22)
where for the last two constraints, we suppose that †0 > 0.23 We note in particular that a
positive † relaxes the two incentive constraints for the coalition composed of one L-type
and one H-type (i.e. (19) and (20)).
From the incentive constraint which prevents the coalition composed of two L-types
from pretending to be the coalition composed of two H-types (18), we obtain a lower
bound for uLL. From the incentive constraint which prevents the coalition composed of
23As explained in the proof of proposition 3, when the grand-mechanism is collusion-proof, the principal
has certain degree of freedom in choosing the values of some multipliers in the third-party￿s program such
that she can make †0 strictly positive.
17one L-type and one H-type from pretending to be the coalition composed of two H-types
(20), we obtain a lower bound for uLH. The lower bound for uLH is the smallest when δ/†
is the largest. Since we want to obtain the supremum of the principal￿s payoﬀ,w ea l l o w
δ/† to take pLL/pLH.24 Therefore, we obtain the following rent scheme from the two lower
bounds:
uLL = ∆θq





∗ − b q
∗),u HL = uHH =0 .
Under this scheme, the L-type￿s incentive compatibility constraint is binding and the H-
type￿s one is slack if pLL >p LH holds and if ∆θ is small enough. The L-type￿s ex post
participation constraint when the other reports H-type is slack if ∆θ is small enough. We
assume in what follows that pLL >p LH holds and ∆θ is small enough.25
When the principal oﬀers the above rent scheme, there exists room for collusion only
for the coalition composed of one L-type and one H-type. First, the coalition always has
the incentive to manipulate its report to (θH,θH). The manipulation does not aﬀect the
H-type￿s rent since his ex post participation constraint always binds while it increases the
L-type￿s rent since the following inequality holds:
uLH < ∆θq
∗. (23)
Second, the coalition may have the incentive to manipulate its report to (θL,θL) since,
when correlation is very strong, the following inequality can hold:
uLH < 2uLL − ∆θq
∗. (24)
However, in the presence of asymmetric information, when δ/† is equal to pLL/pLH,
the above rent scheme satis￿es the two incentive constraints for the coalition composed






∗ − b q
∗). (25)





∗ − b q
∗), (26)
Hence, asymmetric information allows the principal to implement the optimal grand-
mechanism without side-contracting in a collusion-proof way. Therefore, we have:
24In the proof of proposition 5, for any given ε > 0,w e￿nd a collusion-proof grand-mechanism which
gives the principal a payoﬀ which is ε-close to the payoﬀ obtained by taking δ/† equal to pLL/pLH.
25We note that we already assumed that ∆θ is small enough for ρ > ρ∗ in Proposition 1.
18Proposition 5 Suppose that for ρ > ρ∗, pLL >p LH holds and ∆θ is small enough and
collusion takes place under asymmetric information between the agents.
(i) In the case of strong positive correlation (ρ > ρ∗),the principal can implement the
optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting which exhibits a non-monotonic quan-
tity schedule in a collusion-proof way without additional loss.
(ii) Therefore, the principal can implement the optimal grand-mechanism without side-
contracting in a collusion-proof way without additional loss regardless of the sign and the
degree of correlation.
Proposition 5(ii) results from proposition 4(i)and proposition 5(ii). The intuition of
t h er e s u l tt h a ta s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o nc a nm a k ec o l l u s i o nf a i lc a nb eg i v e na sf o l l o w s .W e
￿rst note that in order to realize the gains from collusion, the third-party should require
an H-type to produce more quantity than the quantity he would produce in the absence
of collusion. Since the rent that an L-type can obtain by pretending to have an H-type to
the third-party is increasing in the quantity produced by an H-type, an L-type￿ incentive
to pretend to have an H-type is higher in the presence of collusion than in the absence
of collusion. As a consequence, the third-party must concede to an L-type a rent larger
than the one he would obtain in the absence of collusion. This increase in the rent is the
transaction costs in side-contracting generated by asymmetric information, which makes
collusion fail.
To illustrate our point, we consider the case in which the third-party implements
the manipulation of report from (θL,θH) and (θH,θL) to (θH,θH) given that the principal
oﬀers the rent scheme previously described. The expected gains from this manipulation of
report is given by pLL∆θ(q∗−b q∗). Suppose now that agent i has the L-type and pretends to
have an H-type when he reports to the third-party while j (with j 6= i) reports truthfully
regardless of his type. Then, regardless of j￿s type, the third-party will ask the agents
to report (θH,θH) to the principal and consequently the agents will always produce q∗.
Hence, an L-type can have a rent equal to ∆θq∗ by pretending to have an H-type, which is




pLL+pLH∆θq∗. Hence, the expected increase in the L- t y p e ￿ sr e n ti sg i v e n
by pLL∆θ(q∗ − b q∗), which represents the transaction costs in side-contracting generated
by asymmetric information. Therefore, the transaction costs are as large as the gains
from collusion. In the proof of proposition 5, we show that the principal can make the
transaction costs strictly larger than the gains from collusion by increasing uLL and uHL by
ε (> 0) which is small enough. Increasing uLL and uHL b yt h es a m ea m o u n ti sn e c e s s a r y
to keep the L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint binding. Under the modi￿ed scheme,
19the expected gains from collusion are reduced by ε2pLH while the transaction costs are not
aﬀected by ε. Therefore, the third-party cannot implement the manipulation of report.
Since ε can be chosen close to zero, the principal can implement the optimal schedule in a
collusion-proof way without additional cost. We note that in the case of manipulation of
report from (θL,θH) and (θH,θL) to (θL,θL), the transaction costs are much lager since an





to have an H-type.26
In summary, asymmetric information puts restrictions on the plausible rules to share
the gains from collusion such that only the rules that give an L- t y p em o r et h a nt h e
gains from collusion are incentive compatible, which makes collusion fail. The suﬃcient
condition pLL >p LH is easily satis￿ed for ρ > ρ∗ if the probability of having two H-types
is close to the probability of having two L-types since, when pLL = pHH, the condition
holds if ρ > 0.L a ﬀont and Martimort (2000) show that, in the polar case of almost perfect
correlation, the principal can achieve an almost ￿rst-best outcome by implementing a non-
monotonic quantity schedule. Therefore, proposition 5 extends their result to the case of
ρ > ρ∗.
6 Failure to collude under asymmetric information:
dominant-strategy implementation
In this section, we study the impact of asymmetric information on collusion under dominant-
strategy implementation (i.e. each agent is induced to tell the truth whatever the other
agent￿s report). Since dominant-strategy mechanisms are not sensitive to beliefs that
agents have about each other, the principal might prefer these mechanisms to Bayesian
mechanisms. However, focusing on dominant-strategy mechanisms considerably restricts
the set of mechanisms. This restriction in turn can create room for collusive behavior.
Here, we study how asymmetric information helps the principal to implement the opti-
mal mechanism without side-contracting in dominant strategies and in a collusion-proof
way. As in the previous section, we ￿rst examine whether the optimal mechanism without
side-contracting exhibits any room for collusion when collusion takes place under com-
plete information. Second, we study how asymmetric information aﬀects collusion. We
26Since the H-type￿s ex post participation constraint has to be satis￿ed in a side-contract, the third-
party has to give at least a transfer equal to θHq∗ to an H-type when he implements the manipulation
from (θL,θH) and (θH,θL) to (θL,θL). Hence, by pretending to have an H-type, an L-type will have at
least a rent equal to ∆θq∗ with probability
pLL
pLL+pLH .
20continue to assume that the third-party can use Bayesian mechanisms.27
The transfer scheme which implements the optimal grand-mechanism without side-
contracting in dominant strategies is uniquely given by:
n
tLL = θLq
∗ + ∆θb q
∗,t LH = θLb q
∗ + ∆θq
∗,t HL = θH b q




When the optimal schedule is not monotonic, the above transfer scheme does not satisfy
the H-type￿s incentive compatibility constraint when the other agent reports θH (10).
Therefore, in this section, we focus on the case in which the schedule is monotonic. For
expositional facility, we introduce some de￿nitions.
De￿nition 4 The quantity schedule is called I-decreasing if q∗ > b q∗ ≥ q∗ and q∗ − b q∗ <
b q∗ − q∗ hold and D-decreasing if q∗ > b q∗ ≥ q∗ and q∗ − b q∗ ≥ b q∗ − q∗hold.
The above distinction turns out to be useful when we study collusion.
6.1 Collusion under complete information
Suppose that collusion takes place under complete information between the agents. When
the optimal quantity schedule is monotonic, it is easy to see that only one manipulation of
report can be pro￿table under the above transfer scheme: the coalition composed of one
L-type and one H-type will have the incentive to pretend to be the coalition composed
of two L-types if the optimal quantity schedule is I-decreasing: q∗ − b q∗ < b q∗ −q∗. To give
the intuition about why this manipulation generates gains from collusion, we consider
the case in which the degree of negative correlation is so strong (for example, pLL and
pHH are very small) that q∗ is close to b q∗ while q∗ is almost equal to zero. Then, if the
coalition composed of one L-type and one H-type announces the truth or pretends to be
t h ec o a l i t i o nc o m p o s e do ft w oH-types, its rent is equal to ∆θq∗ ≈ 0. On the contrary,
if the coalition pretends to be the coalition composed of two L-types, its rent is equal to
∆θ(2b q∗ − q∗) ≈ ∆θb q∗ ￿ 0. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose that collusion takes place under complete information between
the agents. The optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting can be implemented
in a collusion-proof way and in dominant strategies if and only if the optimal quantity
schedule is D-decreasing.
Example 1 When ∆θ is small enough, the optimal quantity schedule is D-decreasing for
ρ with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ∗.
27We can also require the third-party to use dominant-strategy mechanisms. Then, collusion will be
even more ineﬃcient.
216.2 Failure to collude under asymmetric information
We now consider the case in which collusion takes place under asymmetric information
between the agents. The incentive constraint for the coalition made of one L-type and
one H-type not to pretend the coalition made of two L-types is given as follows:
(q
∗ − b q








Since the L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint is binding when the principal oﬀers MD,
we know that the H-type￿s virtual cost can be superior to his real cost. In other words,
δ/† can be strictly positive. A positive δ/† relaxes the above coalition incentive constraint.
The constraint is the most relaxed when δ/† is equal to pLL/pLH.28 Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 7 In the presence of asymmetric information between the agents, the op-
timal grand-mechanism without side-contracting can be implemented in a collusion-proof
way and in dominant strategies if the quantity schedule is decreasing and satis￿es the
following inequality:
(q
∗ − b q






∗ − b q
∗).
Example 2 Suppose that ∆θ is small enough. Then, in the presence of asymmetric
information, the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting can be implemented










We know from example 1 that when ∆θ is small enough, there exists room for collusion
whenever correlation is negative. Example 2 states that when the degree of negative
correlation is not very strong, asymmetric information makes the agents unable to realize
the gains from collusion.
The intuition for the result derived in this section is similar to the one given in the
previous section. What is important in both sections is that in order to realize the gains
from collusion, the third-party has to require an H-type to produce more quantity than
he would produce in the absence of collusion. Laﬀont and Martimort (1997) show that in
the case of no correlation, the optimal contract can be implemented in a collusion-proof
way and in dominant strategies. We generalize their result to the case of weak positive
and weak negative correlation.
28Again, to focus on the supremum of the principal￿s payoﬀ, we allow δ/† to be equal to pLL/pLH.I n
the proof of proposition 7, we use a diﬀerent approach to obtain the result that we ￿nd by taking δ/†
equal to pLL/pLH.
227 Concluding remarks
We studied collusion in a setting in which the agents have correlated types and produce
complementary inputs such that an agent in￿icts information and production externalities
on the other agent when he makes a report to the principal. Hence, the agents have the
incentive to coordinate their reports in order to internalize the externalities. We found
that when the agents collude under asymmetric information, they fail to realize the gains
from collusion because of the incentive problem within the coalition and that the principal
can implement the optimal mechanism without side-contracting in a collusion-proof way
by judiciously exploiting the transaction costs in coalition formation.
In our model, participation constraints should be satis￿ed ex post since we assume
that the principal cannot force the agents to bear losses. Therefore, our result implies that
when participation constraints should be satis￿ed ex post, only the individual incentive
constraints matter and the coalition incentive constraints are irrelevant. In contrast,
Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) show that when participation constraints should be satis￿ed
in expected terms, only the coalition incentive constraints matter and the individual
incentive constraints are irrelevant. Since zero-liability and unlimited liability represent
two extreme cases, it would be interesting to study the intermediate case.
Although our setting is simple29,t h ei n s i g h tw ed e r i v ea b o u tt h et r a n s a c t i o nc o s t si n
coalition formation has general implication. What is crucial for asymmetric information
to create the transaction costs in our model is that in order to realize the gains from
collusion, the third-party has to require an H-type to produce more quantity than he
would produce in the absence of collusion. This makes the third-party, in order to induce
truth-telling, give an L-type more rent than he would obtain in the absence of collusion and
therefore creates the transaction costs. In contrast, if we interpret Laﬀont and Martimort
(2000)￿s weak correlation case from the point of view of our setting,30 in order to realize
the gains from collusion, the third-party should require an H-type to produce less quantity
than he would have produced in the absence of collusion. Thus, an L-type would have
less incentive to pretend to be an H-type to the third-party in the presence of collusion
than in its absence. This is why they ￿nd asymmetric information does not create any
29Extention to the case with more than two agents raises the question of how to deal with subcoalitions.
Extention to the case with more than two types can be done at the cost of complexity since in this case,
collusion problem becomes a sort of multi-dimensional screening problem in terms of the coaltion incentive
constraints.
30In fact, they consider a public good provision problem. Therefore, their high-valuation type (low-
valuation type) corresponds to the L-Type (H-type) in our model.
23transaction cost.
The above comparison shows that, from the point of view of collusion, asymmetric
information can create either con￿ict of interest between the agents as in our case or con-
gruence of interest as in their case. With future research, we hope to ￿nd the fundamental
factors that make asymmetric information create either con￿ict or congruence of interest
between the agents.
Finally, the stark contrast between complete information case (proposition 4(ii)) and
asymmetric information case (proposition 5(i)) suggests a question for future research:
it would be interesting to study the intermediate information structure in terms of each
agent￿ knowledge about the other￿s type in order to see whether there is a continuity
of the optimal collusion-proof mechanism with respect to the superiority of the agents￿
internal information.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Let
f(•)=pLL[S(q) − 2tLL]+2 pLH[S(b q) − tLH − tHL]+pHH[S(q) − 2tHH],
g1(•)=pLL(tLL − θL q)+pLH(tLH − θLb q) − pLL(tHL − θLb q) − pLH(tHH − θLq),
g2(•)=pLH(tHL − θH b q)+pHH(tHH − θHq) − pLH(tLL − θHq) − pHH(tLH − θH b q),
g3(•)=tLL − θL q,
25g4(•)=tLH − θLb q,
g5(•)=tHL − θH b q,
g6(•)=tHH − θHq.
Then, the principal￿s problem is given by:
max f(•)
subject to
gi(•) ≥ 0, for i =1 ,...,6.
De￿ne the Lagrangian as follows:




Since f(•) is concave and gi(•) is linear, the Kuhn-Tucker condition is suﬃcient. It is easy
to verify that the following candidate satis￿es the Kuhn-Tucker condition:
t
∗





when ρ ≤ ρ
∗, t
∗
LL = θL q




LH = θLb q
∗ + ∆θq
∗,
when ρ > ρ
∗, t
∗
LL = θL q

























￿1 =2 ,￿ 2 = ￿3 = ￿4 =0 ,￿ 5 =2 ( pLL + pLH),￿ 6 =2 ( pLH + pHH).
When ρ ≤ ρ∗, the optimal quantity schedule is monotonic in the sum of the agents￿ cost
parameters (q∗ > b q∗ ≥ q∗)a n dw h e nρ > ρ∗,i ti sn o tm o n o t o n i c( q∗ > q∗ > b q∗).




HH,q∗, b q∗,q∗)s a t i s ￿es the H-type￿s
Bayesian incentive constraint. First, when the optimal quantity schedule is monotonic (i.e.
ρ ≤ ρ∗), it is manifest that the candidate satis￿es strictly the H-type￿s Bayesian incentive
constraint. Hence, the principal has a residual degree of freedom in choosing (tLL,t LH):
a small change from the transfer scheme speci￿ed in the above candidate, keeping the L-
type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint binding, can satisfy the H-type￿s Bayesian incentive
constraint.
26Second, when the optimal quantity schedule is not monotonic (i.e. ρ > ρ∗), the
transfer scheme in which the principal gives rent only when both agents have an L-type
maximizes the chance to satisfy the H-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint. We show
below that when ∆θ is small enough, the above candidate strictly satis￿es the H-type￿s
Bayesian incentive constraint.





∆θq − ∆θq) − pHH∆θb q ≤ 0.
It can be equivalently written as follows:
−(pLLpHH − (pLH)
2)b q − pLLpLH(q − b q)+( pLH)
2 (q − b q) ≤ 0,
which holds when ∆θ is small enough, since the ￿rst term dominates the last two terms.
Since the inequality is strictly satis￿ed, the principal has a residual degree of freedom in
choosing (tLL,t LH).
Regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation, the set of the transfers which
implement the optimal mechanism without side-contracting is given by:
n
tLL ≥ θLq
∗,t LH ≥ θLb q
∗,t HL = θH b q






















Proof of proposition 2
Let M∗ be an initial grand-mechanism oﬀered by the principal, which satis￿es the
incentive compatibility and ex post participation constraints. Let S∗ be a coalition-
interim-eﬃcient side-contract with regard to the reservation utilities given by Vi(θi),t h e
payoﬀ of agent i when each agent plays non-cooperatively M∗. Suppose that the side-
contract S∗ contingent on the oﬀer of the grand-mechanism M∗ gives a payoﬀ Ui(θi) for
each agent. Then, from the interim-eﬃciency of the side-contract S∗,w ek n o wt h a ti t
satis￿es the incentive compatibility, acceptance, budget balance and ex post participation
constraints.
De￿ne now a new grand-mechanism M∗∗ by M∗ ◦S∗. We note that from the interim-
eﬃciency of the side-contract S∗, the new grand-mechanism satis￿es the incentive com-
patibility and ex post participation constraints. We can show that this grand-mechanism
27is collusion-proof. Equivalently, it is optimal for the third-party to oﬀer the null side-
contract.
Suppose not, then there exists an interim-eﬃcient side-contract S0 diﬀerent from the
null side-contract, which gives a sum of expected utilities strictly higher than the one
achieved by the null side-contract. But this contradicts the coalition-interim-eﬃciency of
S∗. Suppose that the side-contract S0 contingent on the oﬀer of the grand-mechanism
M∗∗ gives a payoﬀ U0
i(θi) for each agent. Then, from the interim-eﬃciency of the side-
contract S0,i ts a t i s ￿es the incentive compatibility, acceptance, budget balance and ex
post participation constraints. In particular, the following inequality should hold for each
agent: U0
i(θi) ≥ Ui(θi). Consider now the side-contract S∗ ◦ S0 contingent on the oﬀer
of the grand-mechanism M∗.S i n c e w e h a v e t h a t U0
i(θi) ≥ Ui(θi) ≥ Vi(θi), S∗ ◦ S0 can
be implemented by the third-party. Moreover, it should guarantee strictly higher utility
at least for one agent without reducing the other￿s utility. This contradicts the interim-
eﬃciency of the side-contract S∗.
Proof of proposition 3
We are interested in grand-mechanisms such that the H-type￿s incentive constraint is
not binding. The third-party￿s problem is given by:
max
φ,y1,y2
pLL[t1(φLL)+t2(φLL) − 2θLq(φLL)] + pLH[t1(φLH)+t2(φLH) − (θL + θH)q(φLH)]
+pLH[t1(φHL)+t2(φHL) − (θH + θL)q(φHL)] + pHH[t1(φHH)+t2(φHH) − 2θHq(φHH)]
subject to
￿ Budget balance constraint:
2 X
k=1
yk(θi,θj)=0 , ∀(θi,θj) ∈ Θ
2, (28)
￿ L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint for agent 1:
pLL[t1(φLL) − y1(θL,θL) − θLq(φLL)] + pLH[t1(φLH) − y1(θL,θH) − θLq(φLH)]
≥ pLL[t1(φHL) − y1(θH,θL) − θLq(φHL)] + pLH[t1(φHH) − y1(θH,θH) − θLq(φHH)], (29)
￿ L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint for agent 2 :
pLL[t2(φLL) − y2(θL,θL) − θLq(φLL)] + pLH[t2(φHL) − y2(θH,θL) − θLq(φHL)]
≥ pLL[t2(φLH) − y2(θL,θH) − θLq(φLH)] + pLH[t2(φHH) − y2(θH,θH) − θLq(φHH)], (30)
28￿ L-type￿s acceptance constraint for agent 1:
pLL[t1(φLL)−y1(θL,θL)−θLq(φLL)]+pLH[t1(φLH)−y1(θL,θH)−θLq(φLH)] ≥ (pLL+pLH)V (θL),
(31)
￿ L-type￿s acceptance constraint for agent 2 :
pLL[t2(φLL)−y2(θL,θL)−θLq(φLL)]+pLH[t2(φHL)−y2(θH,θL)−θLq(φHL)] ≥ (pLL+pLH)V (θL),
(32)
￿ H-type￿s acceptance constraint for agent 1:
pLH[t1(φHL)−y1(θH,θL)−θHq(φHL)]+pHH[t1(φHH)−y1(θH,θH)−θHq(φHH)] ≥ (pLH+pHH)V (θH),
(33)
￿ H-type￿s acceptance constraint for agent 2 :
pLH[t2(φLH)−y2(θL,θH)−θHq(φLH)]+pHH[t2(φHH)−y2(θH,θH)−θHq(φHH)] ≥ (pLH+pHH)V (θH),
(34)
￿ Ex post participation constraints for agent 1: ￿rst, when he has an L-type and the
other also has an L-type,
t1(φLL) − y1(θL,θL) − θLq(φLL) ≥ 0, (35)
second, when he has an L-type while the other has an H-type,
t1(φLH) − y1(θL,θH) − θLq(φLH) ≥ 0, (36)
third, when he has an H-type while the other has an L-type,
t1(φHL) − y1(θH,θL) − θHq(φHL) ≥ 0, (37)
last, when he has an H-type and the other also has an H-type,
t1(φHH) − y1(θH,θH) − θHq(φHH) ≥ 0, (38)
￿ Ex post participation constraints for agent 2:
t2(φLL) − y2(θL,θL) − θLq(φLL) ≥ 0, (39)
t2(φHL) − y2(θH,θL) − θLq(φHL) ≥ 0, (40)
t2(φLH) − y2(θL,θH) − θHq(φLH) ≥ 0, (41)
t2(φHH) − y2(θH,θH) − θHq(φHH) ≥ 0. (42)
29We introduce the following multipliers:
￿ ρ(θ1,θ2) for the budget-balance constraint in state (θ1,θ2),
￿ δi for the L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint concerning agent i,
￿ vLi for the L-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning agent i,
￿ vHi for the H-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning agent i,
￿ λi(θ1,θ2) for the ex post participation constraint in state (θ1,θ2) concerning agent i.
We de￿ne the Lagrangian as follows:



















Starting from a symmetric equilibrium of the grand-mechanism, the solution to (T)i s
symmetric and we have:
δi = δ,v Li = vL,v Hi = vH,
λLL = λ1(θL,θL)=λ2(θL,θL), λLH = λ1(θL,θH)=λ2(θH,θL),
λHL = λ1(θH,θL)=λ2(θL,θH),λHH = λ1(θH,θH)=λ2(θH,θH).




















pLH(1 + δ + vL)+λLH
.
￿ Optimizing with respect to φHH yields:












pHH(1 + vH)+λHH − δpLH
.





[t1(φHH)+t2(φHH) − 2(θH +
δ
†0∆θ)q(φHH)].






￿ After optimizing with respect to side-transfers, we obtain some relationships between









pLH (λLH − λHL)+λHH
.
￿ Note that (31) to (34) are binding for a collusion-proof mechanism. Hence, for such
a mechanism, the slackness conditions obtained from the Lagrangian optimization do not
give any information on the multipliers vL and vH.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i ft h eH-type￿s incentive
constraint and the L-type￿s ex post participation constraints are binding in a grand-
mechanism which is collusion-proof, the slackness conditions do not give any information













Proof of proposition 4
Since (i) is proved in the main texts, we only need to prove (ii). The proof is based
on a standard revealed preference argument. Let φLH (respectively, φHH)t h eo p t i m a l
manipulation of report for the coalition (θL,θH) or (θH,θL) (respectively, (θH,θH)). Then,
the following inequalities should be satis￿ed: for the coalition composed of one L-type
and one H-type,
t1(φLH)+t2(φLH) − (θL + θH)q(φLH) ≥ t1(φHH)+t2(φHH) − (θL + θH)q(φHH);
for the coalition composed of two H-types,
t1(φHH)+t2(φHH) − 2θHq(φHH) ≥ t1(φLH)+t2(φLH) − 2θHq(φLH).
After summing the two inequalities, we obtain q(φLH) ≥ q(φHH).
Using the same kind of argument, we can obtain q(φLL) ≥ q(φLH).H e n c e , o n l y a
monotonic quantity schedule (q(φLL) ≥ q(φLH) ≥ q(φHH))c a nb ei m p l e m e n t e di na
collusion-proof way when collusion takes place under complete information.




31Proof of proposition 5
We only need to prove (i). Suppose that the principal oﬀers the optimal grand-
mechanism without side-contracting with the following transfer scheme:
tLL = θLq
∗ + ∆θq






∗ − b q
∗),
tHL = θHb q
∗,t HH = θHq
∗.
First, we show that the coalition composed of one L-type and one H-type has the
incentive to manipulate its reports in the absence of transaction costs. The coalition has
the incentive to announce (θH,θH) if the following inequality holds:
uLH < ∆θq
∗,
which is the case since we have uLH = ∆θq∗ −
pLL
pLH
∆θ(q∗ − b q∗).
The coalition has the incentive to announce (θL,θL), if the following inequality holds:
uLH < 2uLL − ∆θq
∗,
which is the case if ρ ≥ (
2pLH
pLL +1 ) ρ∗.
It is easy to see that there does not exist any room for collusion for the other coalitions.
Second, we examine the third-party￿s problem: whether or not the third-party can
successfully implement the manipulation of report from (θL,θH)a n d( θH,θL)t o( θL,θL)
or (θH,θH). Since the two agents are perfectly symmetric, without loss of generality, we
focus on the set of symmetric side-contracts. Consider the stochastic manipulation from
(θL,θH)a n d( θH,θL)t o( θL,θL) with probability p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) and from (θL,θH)a n d
(θH,θL)t o( θH,θH) with probability 1−p. Let b y the transfer from the L-type to the H-type
when the agents announce (θL,θH)o r( θH,θL). To show that it is strictly impossible for
the third-party to implement the above stochastic manipulation, we consider the following
ε-close optimal scheme:
uLL = ∆θq





∗ − b q
∗),u HL = ε,u HH =0 ,
where ε(> 0) is small enough in order not to create any other room for collusion. It is easy
to check, under the above scheme, that the individual incentive constraints and the ex
post participation constraints are satis￿ed and that there exists no other stake of collusion
except the manipulation of report from (θL,θH)a n d( θH,θL)t o( θL,θL)o r( θH,θH).
32Suppose that the principal proposes the above scheme and the third-party wants to
implement the stochastic manipulation using b y.
Then the side-contract should satisfy the L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint, which
is given by:
pLLuLL + pLH[puLL +( 1− p)∆θq
∗ − b y] ≥ pLL[puLL +( 1− p)∆θq
∗ + b y]+pLH∆θq
∗. (43)




∗) ≥ b y. (44)
The side-contract should satisfy the H-type￿s acceptance constraint, which is given
by:
pLH[p(uLL − ∆θq
∗)+( 1− p)uHH + b y]+pHHuHH
≥ pLHuHL + pHHuHH.
It gives a lower bound for b y:
b y ≥ uHL + p(∆θq
∗ − uLL). (45)
Hence, for the third-party to implement the stochastic manipulation, there should be
a transfer b y which satis￿es the following constraints:
pLL(1 − p)+pLHp
pLL + pLH
ε ≥ b y ≥ ε + p(∆θq
∗ − uLL).
Since the L.H.S. is strictly smaller than ε while the R.H.S. is greater than ε,w eh a v e
shown that the third-party cannot implement the stochastic manipulation.
The same kind of argument can be applied when we consider only the manipulation
from (θL,θH)a n d( θH,θL)t o( θL,θL)( o rf r o m( θL,θH)a n d( θH,θL)t o( θH,θH)). Since we
can choose ε arbitrarily small, the principal can implement the optimal grand-mechanism
without side-contracting in a collusion-proof way without additional loss.
Proof of proposition 7




pLH. Suppose that the principal proposes MD. We investigate whether or not
the third-party can successfully implement the manipulation from (θL,θH)a n d( θH,θL)
to (θL,θL) by examining the third-party￿s problem. Hence, when the agents announce
33to the third-party either (θL,θL)o r( θH,θH), there is no manipulation of report and no
side-transfer. Because the two agents are perfectly symmetric, without loss of generality,
we focus on the set of symmetric side-contracts. Let b y the transfer from the L-type to
the H-type when the agents announce (θL,θH)o r( θH,θL).
The L-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint is given by:
pLL(tLL − θ q
∗)+pLH(tLL − b y − θq
∗) ≥ pLL(tLL + b y − θq
∗)+pLH(tHH − θq
∗). (46)





∗)∆θ ≥ b y. (47)
The H-type￿s ex post participation constraint when the other agent has an L-type is
given by:
tLL + b y − θHq
∗ ≥ 0. (48)
After some calculations, it can be simpli￿ed as follows:
b y ≥ (q
∗ − b q
∗)∆θ. (49)
Hence, the third-party cannot successfully implement the manipulation of report, if
the following inequality holds:
(q







which is equivalent to the following inequality:
(q
∗ − b q






∗ − b q
∗). (51)
34